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Distributive justice has been the focus of norma-tive political theory over the last half century, and John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) is 
widely seen as the most important attempt during that 
period to articulate a set of institutions and distribution-
al outcomes that rational individuals would see as legiti-
mate. Rawls’ seminal work has spawned a veritable crit-
ical industry since its publication (Daniels 1989; Miller 
1999). His recent elaboration of his project and restate-
ment of his theory of “justice as fairness” (1996, 2001) 
promise to sustain interest in his ideas.
Rawls’ project of constructing a situation in which 
impartial individuals choose principles of justice may 
resonate particularly strongly for members of the mod-
ern social welfare state because we expect similarly im-
partial behavior and fairness in the distribution of social 
benefi ts and burdens. Indeed, research suggests the le-
gitimacy of the state depends in large measure on per-
ceived procedural and distributive justice (Rasinski 
1987; Weatherford 1992; Alwin, Gornev, and Khakhuli-
na 1995). Empirical researchers are therefore interested 
in people’s views on distributive justice, but the picture 
emerging from public opinion and other studies is one 
of individuals who seem to have confl icting views (Lane 
1962; Hochshild 1981; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Ver-
ba and Orren 1985; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Verba et al. 
1987; Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener 1995). Experimen-
tal research nonetheless reveals that people have com-
plex rather than confl icting ideas about justice (see Mill-
er 1999, chaps. 3–4; Törnblom 1992; Elster 1995; Tyler 
et al. 1997; Hegtvedt and Cook 2001). As we recently 
argued (Scott et al. 2001), distributive justice behavior 
is complex but structured: distributive justice judgments 
involve several distinct allocation principles and are in-
fl uenced in predictable ways by independent factors. The 
experimental method is an ideal way to critically ana-
lyze theories of justice (see Elster 1995) and to explore 
the structure of distributive justice behavior, both to un-
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derstand a broad range of social phenomena and to de-
sign proper instruments to study them in all their com-
plexity (see Sniderman et al. 1986; Lacy 2001). 
This article synthesizes normative and empirical re-
search with an experimental study of how individuals 
use allocation principles in judgments of income dis-
tribution under conditions of strict impartiality. Strictly 
impartial individuals are the focus for two reasons. First, 
we want to understand distributive behaviors and insti-
tutions that are—or are supposed to be—impartial in na-
ture. Second, we are interested in the relationship of the 
normative prin ciples themselves apart from any instru-
mental factors, since, despite the focus on solely instru-
mental theories in much social science research, numer-
ous studies show that normative beliefs also determine 
people’s behavior (see Sen 1977; Tyler et al. 1997). As 
Konow (2001, 139; see 2000) argues, we need to isolate 
“unbiased justice” to understand the interactions among 
egocentric and prin cipled factors that determine behav-
ior. Our experiment is designed in part to explore the re-
sults of our study con cerning gender differences in dis-
tributive justice behavior and to extend their analysis to 
race (Scott et al. 2001). In order to permit a meaningful 
test of the infl uence of race in particular, we use a large 
and diverse participant pool. Our experiment is also spe-
cifi cally designed to examine to what extent individuals 
use a Rawlsian maximin strat egy in prioritizing alloca-
tion principles, enabling us to explore the contradictory 
results of recent experimental studies (Frohlich and Op-
penheimer 1992; Mitchell et al. 1993). 
We begin with a discussion of prior research, out-
lining the allocation principles we examine in relation to 
Rawls’ theory of justice and reviewing previous experi-
mental studies. Next we present the experimental design 
and our theoretical predictions. We then present the re-
sults of two separate analyses: a regression analyses of 
individuals’ behavior and a categorization of strategies 
individuals’ use in prioritizing allocation principles ac-
cording to several theoretical models. Finally, we offer a 
discussion of our results and conclude with some obser-
vations on the complex structure of distributive justice 
behavior and its importance for social inquiry. 
Allocation Principles in 
Distributive Justice Research
While there are myriad theories about what is “just” or 
“fair,” there is also considerable consensus in theoreti-
cal and empirical research over a small number of al-
location principles. Four analytically distinct allocation 
principles emerge from a review of the literature: equal-
ity, effi ciency, need, and merit. Since our experiment is 
designed in part to determine to what extent individuals 
prioritize these principles consistent with Rawls’ expec-
tations, we will outline them with reference to his theo-
ry of justice. 
Allocation Principles in Rawls’ 
Theory of Justice
Rawls’ aim is to construct a theory of justice by estab-
lishing how rational individuals would choose principles 
of justice under a condition of strict impartiality. He calls 
this approach “justice as fairness” (1971, 11). He propos-
es a thought experiment in which he asks what princi-
ples would be chosen behind a “veil of ignorance” where 
in dividuals do not know their social standing, attributes, 
etc. He makes reference in his resulting theory to all four 
of the allocation principles we have identifi ed. Rawls ac-
knowledges that individuals in actuality very probably do 
make justice decisions by balancing several potentially 
competing allocation principles and using their intuitions 
to assign relative weight. While other prominent theories 
of justice adopt such an “intuitionist” or “pluralist” ap-
proach (e.g., Walzer 1983; Miller 1999), Rawls rejects it 
as inadequate and instead embarks on a “constructivist” 
project in which he argues that these principles should be 
ordered insofar as possible (1971, 34–45). 
Rawls suggests that individuals in the original po-
sition would fi rst choose equality of basic political and 
social rights. Equality also plays an important role in 
his specifi cally distributive theory, for absolute equali-
ty of income is the a priori privileged distributional out-
come and therefore “the benchmark for judging improve-
ments” (1971, 60, 65, 100–1). While there is consider-
able dis agreement over exactly what equality means (Rae 
1981; Sen 1992), we follow Rawls and most other mod-
ern the ories of justice by defi ning equality in absolute 
terms. Despite the primacy of equality, Rawls argues that 
in equality of income and other social goods can be justi-
fi ed by a concern for increased productivity, or effi cien-
cy. Like Rawls, we use the term “effi ciency” to mean that 
individ uals prefer a greater amount of overall goods for 
the same amount of input (see Sen 1992, esp. 6–8). Raw-
ls terms the tension between effi ciency and equality the 
“aggregative- distributive dichotomy” (1971, 36, 44; see 
Okun 1975). He argues that after establishing equality of 
opportunity, rational individuals would tolerate inequali-
ty only to the extent that any increased effi ciency benefi ts 
everyone, and especially “the least well-off.” 
The “difference principle,” as Rawls terms this justifi -
cation of inequality, reveals a concern for need. Raw-
ls has been increasingly clear in framing the difference 
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princi ple in these terms (1971, 277; 1996, esp. 187–90). 
One diffi culty facing theoretical development of need as 
a distinct normative principle is the strong conceptual re-
lationship between need and equality, especially when 
need is conceived of as relative rather than absolute (see 
Braybrooke 1987; Miller 1999, 203–30). To distinguish 
the two principles, we consider need in absolute terms 
as a minimum level of necessary social goods, in keep-
ing with Rawls’ concept of “social minimum.” 
Finally, the principle of merit plays a crucial role in 
Rawls’ theory by way of exclusion. He argues that indi-
viduals not only do not deserve the advantages they enjoy 
from wealth, connections, and other privileges, but that 
they similarly do not deserve any advantages from the 
“natural lottery,” such as intelligence, beauty, strength, or 
even the desire to work hard (1971, 15, 73–4). Accord-
ing to Rawls, the unequal results these advantages pro-
duce in terms of increased effi ciency should be permit-
ted only for their benefi cial consequences to the neediest. 
Some theorists agree with Rawls concerning the mor-
al irrelevance of merit (e.g., Nozick 1974; Okun 1975; 
Hayek 1976), but others follow a tradition dating back at 
least to Aristotle by maintaining that merit is a legitimate 
allocation principle (e.g., Sandel 1982; Sher 1987; Miller 
1999). Our exper iment is designed to determine whether 
individuals do fi nd merit morally relevant and how it af-
fects their use of other allocation principles. 
Experimental Research 
on Distributive Justice
Three previous studies are particularly relevant for 
our research. The fi rst two studies are designed to test 
Rawls’ predictions, but produce contradictory results. 
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) fi nd almost no sup-
port among experimental subjects for a Rawlsian max-
imin model. In their experiments, participants in groups 
are asked to de termine rules for distributing income they 
are to earn by doing an unspecifi ed task (behind a “veil 
of ignorance”). Of the four alternative models among 
which groups choose, they fi nd that groups overwhelm-
ingly choose maximizing income after setting a mini-
mum “fl oor” in come (78%) and almost never choose a 
Rawlsian solution (1%). 
In contrast, Mitchell et al. (1993) argue that their 
study reveals considerable support for Rawls. They ask 
individual participants acting as advisors to a hypotheti-
cal society to rank income distributions posing tradeoffs 
between equality and effi ciency. The major experimen-
tal manipulation is to vary what participants are told 
about the degree to which merit explains income in that 
society. They suggest their results support Rawls in two 
ways. First, they argue Rawls’ suspicion about the valid-
ity of merit is confi rmed since participants tend to pre-
fer equality over effi ciency when luck and other “mor-
ally arbitrary” factors are said overwhelmingly to deter-
mine income. The fi nd ing nevertheless suggests only that 
individuals may act consistent with Rawls’ expectations 
under certain con ditions. Second, they fi nd the behavior 
of a signifi cant number of participants fi ts their stipulat-
ed Rawlsian max imin model. This interpretation is none-
theless question able because their a priori model specifi -
cation may not distinguish egalitarian and Rawlsian solu-
tions since their measure of equality is the absolute dif-
ference between income quartiles rather than the propor-
tional difference (Scott et al. 2001, 752). Although the 
measurement of inequality is a complex and often highly 
technical sub ject (see Temkin 1993; Sen 1997), all major 
measures are proportional rather than absolute, and we 
therefore use a proportional measure in our experiments. 
Finally, since Mitchell et al. (1993) do not vary need in-
dependent of equality it is not clear whether their partic-
ipants were in tolerant of inequality or sensitive to need. 
Later work by two of the authors of their study points out 
this fl aw and shows that individuals exhibit distinct con-
cern for need (Ordónez and Mellers 1993). 
Finally, our recent study (Scott et al. 2001) exam ines 
how individuals use all four allocation principles by vary-
ing them independently. We fi nd that equality, ef fi ciency, 
merit, and need all play a distinct role in dis tributive jus-
tice judgments and that most individuals use all or most 
of these principles simultaneously (see also Konow 2000, 
2001). We also uncover an unexpectedly strong gender 
difference in this behavior. Aside from fi nd ing that wom-
en are more egalitarian than men, we fi nd that women’s 
preferences for equality and effi ciency are affected by in-
formation about merit, with women being less concerned 
with equality as merit increasingly predicts income, but 
that men’s behavior is not affected by such in formation. 
One of our principal aims in the present study is to ex-
plore and extend our results by using an altered experi-
mental design and expanded participant pool. Fi nally, an-
other design difference enables us to distinguish a Raw-
lsian maximin solution from other egalitarian and effi -
ciency-maximizing strategies in order to examine the 
contradictory fi ndings of previous studies. 
Experimental Design and 
Theoretical Predictions
Our experiment examines how individuals use alloca tion 
principles in judgments of income distribution un der 
conditions of strict impartiality. In this section we out-
526                                                     MICHELBACH ET AL. IN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 47 (2003)
line our experimental design and discuss how it enables 
us to test hypotheses about distributive justice behav-
ior through two types of analyses: regression anal ysis of 
between-subject behavior and categorization of within-
subject use of allocation principles according to theoret-
ical models, including a Rawlsian maximin model. 
Experimental Presentation
Participants read a short description of a hypothetical so-
ciety and are asked to imagine they are outside observers 
giving their advice to the society. In order to insure impar-
tiality they are explicitly told they are not members of this 
society. They will evaluate different policies being con-
sidered by the society based on the effects they will have on 
the level and distribution of income as determined by “eco-
nomic studies” (the policies themselves are not de scribed). 
They are then presented with a sample income distribution 
like those they will evaluate (see Figure 1) along with in-
structions on how to interpret it. (See ap pendix for partici-
pant instructions.) After taking a short manipulation check, 
described below, they evaluate nine randomly ordered in-
come distributions. As in the sam ple income distribution, 
each distribution consists of a bar graph that shows the av-
erage income for each quintile and the poverty line and 
presents information about the overall average income and 
the ratio of the incomes of the top and bottom quintiles (the 
“income inequality ratio”). Participants evaluate each distri-
bution on a scale from 0 (“very bad”) to 10 (“very good”). 
Finally, they complete a post-experimental questionnaire 
that elicits information used for the control variables. 
The manipulation check that participants take af ter 
reading the country description and before rating the in-
come distributions is designed to ensure the in ternal
validity of our experiment. It contains questions confi rm-
ing that participants have been successfully ma nipulated 
by the merit and need variables and questions that ascer-
tain whether they can correctly interpret the in formation 
about effi ciency and equality in the income distribu-
tions. Participants who do not answer all these questions 
correctly or do not complete the experiment are not in-
cluded in the data set. We can therefore be as confi  dent 
as possible that participants are revealing meaningful in-
formation about their preferences under the different ex-
perimental conditions. 
Experimental Manipulations
The income distributions rated by participants (Table 
1) are created by manipulating two variables: effi cien-
cy and equality. We operationalize effi ciency as average 
soci etal income and vary it in three levels (low, medium, 
high): $32,000, $42,000, and $55,000.1 We operational-
ize equality as the ratio between the highest and low-
est income quintiles of an income distribution (the “in-
come inequality ratio”) and vary it in three equality lev-
els (high, medium, low). The range of income inequal-
ity for the nine distributions is 2.0 for the most equal 
to 9.0 for the least equal. We increase income inequali-
ty in approxi mately equal steps across the three effi cien-
cy levels within each equality level, with two exceptions 
described below. 
Varying equality and effi ciency in this way poses 
par ticipants with equality-effi ciency tradeoffs that en-
able us to determine the relative weight they place on 
the two principles. Each tradeoff reveals whether par-
ticipants prefer greater effi ciency at the cost of lower 
equality or greater equality at the cost of lower effi cien-
cy. The most conspicuous equality-effi ciency tradeoffs 
are the four di agonal cases, represented by the solid ar-
rows along the diagonals in Table 1. For example, there 
is a tradeoff between the high-equality/medium-effi cien-
cy distribu tion and the medium-equality/high-effi ciency 
one. The former provides moderate average income but 
a fairly equal overall distribution, while the latter pro-
vides sig nifi cantly greater income overall but with great-
er income inequality. 
In addition to posing participants with equality-ef-
fi ciency tradeoffs, this design presents them with trade-
offs between Rawlsian and egalitarian preferences. In or-
der to create those tradeoffs we allow two exceptions to 
the general rule of increasing the inequality of distribu-
1U.S. Census Bureau data was used to construct distributions. In our 
experiment the middle effi ciency level is $42,000 for the average in-
come of a four-person family. Median income for a four-person fam-
ily for 1998 was $42,709 (http://www.census. gov/hhes/income/
4person.html).
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tions in approximately equal steps within each equali-
ty level by placing a higher equality-income distribution 
in the lower equality level. These inverted cases are in-
dicated by the dashed arrows in Table 1. For ex ample, 
the medium-equality/low-effi ciency distribution would 
be the preferred outcome for strong egalitari ans, because 
it has a lower inequality level, while the high-equality/
high-effi ciency distribution would be the preferred out-
come for Rawlsians, because increased effi  ciency pro-
vides greater income for those with the lowest income. 
We will take advantage of this design inno vation in our 
second general analysis when we create theoretical mod-
els to categorize participants’ observed behavior. 
Two variables manipulated between participants al-
low us to study the relationship between equality-effi -
ciency preferences and the other two allocation princi-
ples: merit and need. First, we randomly vary what par-
ticipants are told about the degree to which income is 
explained by effort and ability (10%, 50%, and 90%), 
as opposed to luck, connections, and similar factors, 
in or der to examine how equality-effi ciency preferenc-
es are af fected by assumptions about merit. Second, we 
randomly vary what participants are told about the pov-
erty line ($10,000 or $15,000) in order to distinguish 
participants’ sensitivity to need from their desire for 
equality.2 The poverty line manipulation affects the in-
come distribu tions in the low-equality level, or the bot-
tom (shaded) row in Table 1. When the poverty line is 
$10,000, the lowest income quintile in each of the three 
low-equality income distributions is above the poverty 
line, but when the poverty line is $15,000, these same 
quintiles are below the poverty line, making need a dis-
tinct issue. 
2 U.S. Census Bureau data was used in designing the poverty ma-
nipulation. The poverty line for a four-person family in 1997 was 
$16,400 (http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld97.html).
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Experimental Setting and Participants
Participants are undergraduates at the University of Hous-
ton and Texas Southern University. Participants from 
the University of Houston were tested in under graduate 
courses in political science and sociology, while partici-
pants from Texas Southern University were tested in un-
dergraduate political science courses. There are 667 to-
tal participants in the data set (397 women and 270 men), 
with a diverse population (291 whites, 140 blacks, 142 
Hispanics, 58 Asians, and 36 other race). There are no 
statistically signifi cant differences among testing sites or 
groups, so we combine the data for all analyses. 
Theoretical Predictions and 
Construction of Variables
Our theoretical predictions apply to both our regression 
analyses of between-subject behavior and our categoriza-
tion of within-subject use of allocation principles, but 
the discussion of the construction of variables pertains 
specifi cally to the regression analyses. We will present 
theoretical models of the use of allocation principles 
based on our design when we turn to the categorization 
of participant behavior. 
Equality-effi ciency preferences. Our manipulation of 
equality and effi ciency levels in the income distributions 
is designed to examine how participants use equality and 
effi ciency as allocation principles, especially in relation to 
one another. We examine participants’ use of equality and 
effi ciency in both our general analyses. First, in our regres-
sion analysis we examine how equality-effi ciency prefer-
ences and need sensitivity interact with assump tions about 
merit and how they are affected by indepen dent variables 
such as gender and race. Our dependent variable is an 
Equality-effi ciency tradeoff score created by summing the 
differences between a participant’s ratings of the two dis-
tributions in each of the four diagonal trade offs indicated 
by the solid arrows in Table 1 (e.g., high equality/low ef-
fi ciency – medium equality/medium ef fi ciency). Prefer-
ences for equality result in higher (posi tive) scores, while 
preferences for effi ciency produce lower (negative) scores. 
Second, we further examine partici pants’ use of egalitari-
an and effi ciency-maximizing strate gies in our categoriza-
tion of participant behavior accord ing to different theoret-
ical models. We also develop a distinct Rawlsian maximin 
model in this analysis to de termine to what extent partici-
pants use equality and effi  ciency in accordance with Raw-
ls’ theory. Based on previ ous research (esp. Mitchell et al. 
1993; Scott et al. 2001), we anticipate that relatively few 
participants will be “pure” types, either strong egalitari-
ans, strong effi ciency maxi mizers, or Rawlsians. Instead, 
we expect that most partic ipants will use both equality and 
effi ciency as allocation principles and make tradeoffs be-
tween them with varying emphases on the two principles 
and different strategies for weighing them. 
Need sensitivity. The poverty-line manipulation exam-
ines the distinctness of need as an allocation princi-
ple. In the regression analyses, a Poverty dummy vari-
able iden tifi es the poverty condition to which a partici-
pant is ran domly assigned: 0 if the participant is in the 
$10,000 group and 1 in the $15,000 group, where some 
distributions are affected by the poverty line. We exam-
ine need sensitiv ity in our regression analyses with the 
dependent variable being a Need sensitivity score creat-
ed by summing a par ticipant’s ratings of the three dis-
tributions affected by the poverty manipulation, i.e., the 
three low-equality distri butions in the bottom (shaded) 
row in Table 1. Higher scores indicate decreased sensi-
tivity to need. We expect that participants will give low-
er ratings to distributions affected by the poverty manip-
ulation, with the poverty dummy variable therefore hav-
ing a negative effect on the need-sensitivity score. This 
result would be consis tent with several studies showing 
a distinct concern for need (Scott et al. 2001; Frohlich 
and Oppenheimer 1992; Ordónez and Mellers 1993). 
Merit effects. The merit manipulation is designed to 
test whether equality-effi ciency preferences and need 
sensitiv ity are mediated by assumptions about the de-
gree to which income is explained by effort and abili-
ty, or “merited.” We examine the effect of merit in our 
regression analyses, where we treat the merit level as a 
trichotomous variable. The merit factor (0, 1, 2) identi-
fi es the merit condition to which a participant is random-
ly assigned (10%, 50%, and 90%, respectively). We ex-
pect that participants will be less concerned with equal-
ity as the degree to which income is merited increases. 
The merit factor should therefore have a negative effect 
on the equality-effi ciency tradeoff variable. As noted 
above, although we found that infor mation about mer-
it had a statistically signifi cant effect on the equality-ef-
fi ciency preferences of women but not men (Scott et al. 
2001), we anticipate that our design change may reveal 
the same effect for both genders. We suggested that the 
failure of information about merit to have a sig nifi cant 
effect among men might have been because the tradeoffs 
between equality and effi ciency were so modest as not 
to trigger a reaction from them given their strong prefer-
ence for effi ciency. In the present study we increase the 
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cost of trading off equality for effi ciency by using a wid-
er range of income inequality (2.0 to 9.0 compared to 
2.0 to 6.1 for the earlier study) to see whether men are 
affected by merit assumption. Finally, we also anticipate 
that merit may have a negative effect on the need sen-
sitivity variable since participants may view those below 
the poverty line as increasingly “deservedly” poor. This 
fi nding would be consistent with the tradeoff Ordónez 
and Mellers (1993) fi nd between need and merit, as well 
as our earlier study, although we found this effect for fe-
males alone. 
Control variable effects. Our post-experimental ques-
tionnaire elicits information on demographic and politi-
cal values that provide measures for the control variables 
that studies have suggested affect distributive justice judg-
ments. Of primary interest to us given previous research 
is gender. A number of studies show that women have a 
greater preference for equality, while men tend to weigh 
effi ciency more heavily (Gilligan 1982; Major and Deaux 
1982; Major and Adams 1983; Kluegel and Smith 1986, 
chap. 5; Scott et al. 2001). In addition, women have been 
found to be more sensitive to need and concerned with 
poverty (Kluegel and Miyano 1995; Davidson, Stein-
mann and Wegener 1995; Scott et al. 2001). We there-
fore pre dict that being female will have a positive effect 
on the equality-effi ciency tradeoff score and a negative 
effect on the need sensitivity score. As noted earlier, our 
previous study showed that this gender effect is associ-
ated with the merit manipulation (Scott et al. 2001), and 
we employ an interaction term for gender and merit in 
our regression analyses to explore this connection. 
Race is also a potentially important factor, although 
there is very little relevant experimental research to give 
us guidance in making predictions. As noted previously, 
because of the size of our sample and the diversity of the 
population at our testing sites we have suffi cient num-
bers of minority participants to look at this population 
sep arately. Recent research on issues of distributive jus-
tice has found that blacks generally endorse income dis-
parity based on merit beliefs (Hochschild 1995). Other 
research has suggested that differences between blacks 
and whites over social policies are due in large mea-
sure to differences over fundamental principles, such as 
equality of oppor tunity (Kinder and Winter 2001), or al-
ternatively are re fl ections of differences in group inter-
est (Jackman 1994). Our expectation is that minority re-
spondents will show a greater desire for equality and 
will be more sensitive to issues of need. To test this we 
create a dummy variable for minority participants and 
also include an interaction term for this variable with the 
experimental manipulations we employ (merit and pov-
erty) to explore the possible dif ferential effects of those 
experimental manipulations on these participants. 
Finally, we include a question designed to test the 
internal validity of our experimental manipulations. To 
test for the possibility that participants may be relying 
on their own perceptions of the degree to which merit ex-
plains income our own society rather than our experimen-
tal manipulation of merit level, in the post-experimental 
questionnaire we ask participants for their own view on 
the degree to which income is predicted by effort and 
ability in the U.S., or their independent merit perception 
(0–100%). If the variable does not have a statistically sig-
nifi cant effect, then we can be certain that their behavior 
is conditioned by our experimental manipulation rather 
than their own preconceptions. 
Results of Regression Analyses
Equality-Effi ciency Preferences
We analyze the equality-effi ciency preferences of individ-
uals using the Equality-effi ciency tradeoff score de-
scribed above as the dependent variable. Scores ranged 
from +30 (out of a possible +30), for the participant with 
the most extreme preference for equality, to –26 (out of a 
possible –30), for the participant with the most extreme 
preference for effi ciency (x = 5.34, sd = 9.82). The inde-
pendent vari able of greatest interest is the between-sub-
ject experimen tal manipulation of merit, and we also in-
clude a variable for the poverty manipulation. For con-
trol variables we in clude dummy variables for female 
and minority,3 as well as variables for political ideology, 
mother’s education (our measure of SES),4 and the par-
ticipant’s independent merit perception. Finally, to ex-
amine differences in response to the merit manipulation 
across gender and race we include interaction terms for 
merit and these dummy variables. 
The results of our analysis of equality-effi ciency 
pref erences (Table 2A) show that the effects of the merit 
ma nipulation vary across participants, with a substantial 
dif ference between whites and minorities. Since a com-
plete set of interaction terms is included in the regres-
sion equa tion, the unstandardized coeffi cient of –3.16 
3
We pooled all minority participants because a disaggregated anal ysis 
reveals almost no substantive differences among the subgroups. Ad-
ditionally, we have no theoretical reason to expect different re sults 
across the subgroups. Pooling minority subgroups simplifi es the anal-
ysis and increases its statistical power. We note the few cases of dif-
ferent results for minorities. 
4
We tested three measures of SES and a factor of all three: mother’s ed-
ucation, father’s education, family income. We chose mother’s educa-
tion as the control variable because we have more complete data. The 
results do not change in signifi cant ways if we use the other measures. 
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for merit measures the effect of merit for white males. 
The merit manipulation has a statistically signifi cant ef-
fect for white males in the expected direction, show-
ing that they are in creasingly willing to trade off equal-
ity for effi ciency as merit level increases. Turning to fe-
males, the statistical signifi cance of the dummy variable 
for females indicates that they are more egalitarian than 
white males, as pre dicted. The fact that the female*merit 
interaction term is not statistically signifi cant indicates 
that females do not react differently to the merit manip-
ulation from white males. Recalculating the coeffi cients 
to determine the ef fect of the merit manipulation on fe-
males alone (2.91 (.79)**) reveals that females on aver-
age are also increas ingly tolerant of inequality as merit 
level increases.5 
When we turn to minority participants, however, we 
fi nd surprising results. As for equality-effi ciency prefer-
ences, the fact that the minority variable is not statisti-
cally signifi cant indicates that minorities on average 
have sim ilar preferences to white males, and although 
the result is not quite statistically signifi cant, the neg-
ative coeffi  cient suggests that minorities are unexpect-
edly somewhat less egalitarian than white males.6 There 
are, however, evident differences between racial groups 
in the effect of merit on equality-effi ciency preferenc-
es. Here the fact that the minority*merit interaction term 
is statistically sig nifi cant indicates that minorities react 
differently to the merit manipulation than white males: 
namely, that their equality-effi ciency preferences do not 
change across merit conditions. Supporting evidence 
suggests that minorities may be skeptical about claims 
that income outcomes are due to merit since in answer-
ing our post-experimental question about independent 
merit perception minori ties gave considerably lower es-
timates than whites (although, as we note below, this 
variable is not itself a statistically signifi cant predictor 
of equality-effi ciency preferences). Whereas whites on 
average estimate the re lationship between merit and in-
come outcomes in the U.S. at 67.8% (sd = 19.3), minor-
ities on average an swer 61.3% (sd = 20.5). The differ-
ence is statistically signifi cant. 
As for the other variables, ideology is an impor-
tant predictor of equality-effi ciency preferences. As ex-
pected, liberals are more concerned with equality and 
conserva tives with effi ciency. SES does not show any 
effect. Fi nally, the fact that independent merit percep-
tion is not statistically signifi cant in the analysis sug-
5 In interpreting the interaction terms, we follow Friedrich (1982). In 
refi guring the results of the merit manipulation for females, we add 
the coeffi cient for merit (–3.14) to the coeffi cient for the female*merit 
interaction term (.18) to produce the combined coef fi cient (–2.96), 
and then recalculate the error terms in accordance with the formula 
Friedrich provides. 
6 In the results of the same analysis disaggregated by racial sub-
group, blacks were statistically signifi cantly less egalitarian than 
white males (–3.23 (1.72)*). Results for other minority groups were 
not signifi cant: Hispanics (–1.44 (1.60)), Asians (–1.37 (2.60)), oth-
er race (–3.97 (3.04)). 
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gests that partic ipants’ behavior is explained by our ex-
perimental manip ulation of merit rather than their own 
preconceptions. 
Need Sensitivity
The results of our analysis of need sensitivity (Table 2B) 
also reveal considerable variation across participants, with 
gender an important predictor. The dependent variable is 
the Need sensitivity score, which measures partici pants’ 
ratings of the income distributions affected by the poverty 
manipulation. Since the distributions affected by the pov-
erty line manipulation are also the most unequal distribu-
tions, we must also include interaction terms for the pov-
erty condition with all of the independent vari ables we 
test in order to distinguish the specifi c effect of the pover-
ty manipulation on participants from their reac tions to in-
equality. We use the same independent variables as in the 
previous analysis.7 For the same reason, we in clude in-
teraction terms for merit and these independent variables 
and an interaction term for poverty*merit. 
The main variable of interest for analyzing need 
sensi tivity is the poverty factor, and, as in the previous 
analysis, that variable alone measures the effect of the 
distributions being in poverty for white males because 
of the interaction terms included in the equation. The ef-
fect of the poverty manipulation on white males is in the 
expected direc tion but it is not statistically signifi cant (–
2.07 (1.99)). In turn, although the female*poverty inter-
action term is not statistically signifi cant, the recalcu-
lated effect of the poverty manipulation for females is 
statistically signifi  cant in the predicted direction (3.20 
(1.76)*). Females on average therefore give lower scores 
to the income distribu tions affected by the poverty ma-
nipulation when poverty is an issue than when it is not. 
While the fact that fe males are more sensitive to need is 
consistent with our expectations, our results concerning 
race are surprising. Although the effect is in the predict-
ed direction, the mi nority dummy variable is not statis-
tically signifi cant (1.15 (2.03)),8 indicating that being a 
minority in itself has no effect on need sensitivity. 
Turning to the other variables in the need sensitiv ity 
analysis, we see that the merit factor is statistically sig-
nifi cant, indicating that white males are increasingly tol-
erant of inequality as merit level increases, consistent 
with our analysis of equality-effi ciency preferences. The 
fact that the poverty*merit interaction term is not statis-
tically signifi cant indicates that their propensity to fa-
vor higher effi ciency distributions does not signifi cant-
ly de crease even when poverty is at issue. The same is 
true for females as well as minorities. The SES proxy 
variable is sta tistically signifi cant and negative, indicat-
ing less tolerance for inequality among lower-SES par-
ticipants. The statis tical signifi cance of the SES*poverty 
interaction term, in turn, reveals that lower-SES partici-
pants are somewhat more sensitive to need independent 
of concern for in equality than higher-SES participants, 
in accordance with our expectations. 
We were somewhat surprised at the overall weak-
ness of the poverty manipulation on participants, partic-
ularly among minorities. Our results may also be due in 
part to a fl oor effect. Scores for the low-equality distri-
butions were already so low on average that the added 
poverty condition had only a limited effect. For exam-
ple, where the poverty line was set at $10,000, 42% of 
participants gave the low-equality/high-effi ciency distri-
bution a rating of either 0 or 1. The ratings of the oth-
er two distributions affected by the poverty line manip-
ulation were similarly suppressed. We believe a con-
cern for inequality masked any distinct sensitivity to 
need among at least some participants, which is consis-
tent with a similar result in one experiment in our earlier 
study (Scott et al. 2001). We will return to these results 
in the discussion section. 
Categorizing Participants’ Use of 
Allocation Principles
Our between-subject regression analysis of equality-effi -
ciency preferences reveals that participants vary in their 
use of both equality and effi ciency as allocation prin-
ciples, but this analysis does not enable us to determine 
whether participants are employing a distinct Rawlsian 
maximin strategy. We can examine this question through 
a within-subject analysis of participants’ use of alloca-
tion principles where we compare their observed behav-
ior to several alternative theoretical models. 
Theoretical Models of Participants’ Use 
of Allocation Principles
We develop alternative theoretical models of how individ-
uals might prioritize allocation principles using tradeoffs 
posed by our matrix of income distributions (see Table 
1). We restrict ourselves to models involving egalitarian, 
7 We found heteroskedasticity across the error terms of the stan dard 
OLS regression. We therefore report robust standard error estimators 
using the Huber-White correction. The signifi cance of the indepen-
dent variables is the same for both ways of calculation. 
8 Only Asians show a response to the poverty manipulation (–4.12 
(2.34)*), and, like whites, give lower ratings to distributions affect-
ed by the poverty line when need is an issue. No other minority par-
ticipants show a response to the poverty manipulation, but all are in 
the predicted direction: blacks (–.62 (2.27)), Hispanics (–.03 (2.22)), 
and other race (–2.25 (3.06)). 
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effi ciency-maximization, and Rawlsian maximin strate-
gies. In developing these models we balance the aim of 
using reasonably strict criteria of transitive preferences 
to distinguish between alternative models with the goal 
of capturing as much variance as possible. We therefore 
restrict our criteria to the more salient tradeoffs partic-
ipants face and to those tradeoffs that best enable us to 
distinguish among the models. 
The tradeoffs we use as criteria in constructing the 
theoretical models are represented by the arrows in the 
top fi gure in Figure 2. First, we use three of the four 
conspic uous diagonal tradeoffs used to construct the 
equality-effi ciency score in our regression analysis. Each 
of these tradeoffs poses an obvious choice between a 
more equal but less effi cient distribution and a less equal 
but more effi cient one. We do not use the fourth diag-
onal trade-off (medium equality/low effi ciency vs. low 
equality/ medium effi ciency) as a criterion because of 
the effect of the poverty manipulation on one of the dis-
tributions, but we do retain the other diagonal tradeoff 
affected by the poverty manipulation (medium equality/
medium ef fi ciency vs. low equality/high effi ciency) be-
cause it is par ticularly revealing of preferences for effi -
ciency. Second, we use two horizontal tradeoffs in the 
high-equality row as criteria because they are particular-
ly revealing of egal itarian preferences. Finally, we uti-
lize one of the inverted diagonal tradeoffs as a criteri-
on (medium equality/low ef fi ciency vs. high equality/
high effi ciency) since it poses a choice between egalitar-
ian and Rawlsian maximin strate gies. Whereas a Rawl-
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sian would prefer the effi ciency gain in the high-equali-
ty/high-effi ciency distribution because it maximizes the 
welfare of the least well-off, that is, the lowest income 
quintile, an egalitarian would have the op posite prefer-
ence. We do not use the other inverted case (low equali-
ty/low effi ciency vs. medium equality/high ef fi ciency) as 
a criterion because of the effect of the poverty manipu-
lation on one of the distributions. The remainder of Fig-
ure 2 presents a visual representation of the models we 
have developed, with the arrows indicating the direc tion 
of a participant’s preferences in each of the tradeoffs we 
use as criteria. 
The strictest models are the strong egalitarian and 
strong effi ciency-maximizer models. The strong egalitar-
ian model stipulates that a participant will prefer the 
more equal to the less equal distribution in each of the 
tradeoffs we use as criteria. In turn, the strong effi ciency-
maximizer model is essentially the reverse of the strong 
egalitarian model, with participants always preferring 
the more effi  cient distribution to the less effi cient one in 
each of the tradeoffs. 
The moderate egalitarian and moderate effi ciency-
maximizer models relax the most restrictive criteria used 
in constructing their stronger versions. The mod erate 
egalitarian model follows the strong egalitarian model 
except for two changes. First, it relaxes one of the hori-
zontal tradeoff criteria: a moderate egalitar ian can have a 
preference for signifi cantly greater in come at the cost of 
slightly greater inequality, so they will prefer the high-
equality/medium-effi ciency distri bution to the high-
equality/low-effi ciency one. Second, it relaxes the egali-
tarian criterion of the inverted diag onal case used to dif-
ferentiate strong egalitarians from Rawlsians, stipulating 
that a moderate egalitarian will prefer the high-equality/
high-effi ciency distribution to the medium-equality/low-
effi ciency one. The moderate effi ciency-maximizer mod-
el similarly follows all of the cri teria for the strong effi -
ciency-maximizer model except in the diagonal tradeoff 
with the lowest equality levels, where a participant pre-
fers the medium-equality/medium -effi ciency distribution 
to the low-equality/high-effi ciency distribution, whereas 
the opposite preference is stipulated for the strong effi -
ciency-maximizer model. 
The mixed equality-effi ciency model preserves most 
of the criteria from the moderate egalitarian model while 
re laxing or eliminating others in order to allow for more 
tol erance for inequality than the moderate egalitarian 
model. First, we relax the most egalitarian among the 
three diag onal tradeoffs we have used as criteria, stip-
ulating that a participant using this mixed strategy will 
prefer the medium-equality/medium-effi ciency distribu-
tion to the high-equality/low-effi ciency one. We elimi-
nate two other criteria we have otherwise used in order 
to maximize the variance we explain while retaining a 
fair degree of strict ness in our criteria: the subjects in 
the mixed model are not acting in random fashion. 
Finally, the Rawlsian maximin model is a mixed strat-
egy model with several specifi c characteristics. A partic-
ipant using a Rawlsian maximin strategy will maximize 
both equality and effi ciency, but only on the condition of 
benefi ting the least well-off. We therefore stipulate that, 
as in the egalitarian models, a Rawlsian will prefer the 
more equal to the less equal distribution in all three of 
the di agonal tradeoffs we use as criteria, because they 
are more equal and, more importantly, because the least 
well-off has a higher income level. On the other hand, 
for both of the horizontal tradeoffs the Rawlsian parts 
with the egalitar ians in that she will prefer the more ef-
fi cient distribution to the more equal one, because the 
least well-off are better off even though there is an in-
crease in overall inequality. Lastly, we utilize the invert-
ed diagonal tradeoff to distin guish strong egalitarians 
from Rawlsians, stipulating that a Rawlsian will prefer 
the high-equality/high-effi ciency distribution to the me-
dium-equality/low-effi ciency one because the increased 
effi ciency benefi ts the least well-off. 
Categorizing Observed Behavior
In order to categorize participants’ observed behav-
ior according to the above theoretical models, we see if 
their behavior fi ts all of the criteria we establish for the 
different models. For each of the criteria, we deter mine 
whether their rating for the income distribution they 
should prefer is greater than or equal to the other distri-
bution in the tradeoff. We begin our categoriza tion with 
the strictest models, the strong egalitarian and strong ef-
fi ciency-maximizer models. We then categorize the re-
maining participants using the moderate egalitarian then 
moderate effi ciency models. Finally, we categorize those 
participants who remain using the mixed equality-effi -
ciency and then Rawlsian maximin models. Using this 
procedure, we are able to categorize the observed behav-
ior of 76.0% of participants. 
Figure 3 reports the results of our categorization 
of participants’ observed behavior using the theoreti-
cal models we have developed.9 The results are disag-
9 The effect of using more restrictive theoretical models on the results 
of our categorization of participants’ observed behavior is generally 
quite modest, but at the cost of not being able to categorize as many 
participants. For example, adding both the fourth diagonal tradeoff 
(medium equality/low effi ciency vs. low equality/medium effi cien-
cy) and the second inverted diagonal tradeoff (low equality/low ef-
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gregated by gender, which we found in our between-
subject anal yses was the most important variable in ex-
plaining equality-effi ciency preferences. Consistent with 
the re sults of the regression equations, we see a striking 
differ ence in the behavior of females and males regard-
ing their use of egalitarian and effi ciency-maximizing 
strategies. Females are more likely to be either strong or 
moderate egalitarians than males. Females are also more 
likely than men to use a mixed equality-effi ciency strat-
egy, which is still a relatively egalitarian strategy giv-
en the modest inequality of preferred outcomes. In turn, 
males are far more likely to be moderate effi ciency-
maximizers and es pecially strong effi ciency-maximizers 
than females. 
More importantly, our results reveal that a substan-
tial number of participants (18.0%) have behavior con-
sistent with a distinct Rawlsian maximin strategy. There 
is no difference between females and males in terms of 
whether they are likely to use this strategy. That those 
participants fi tting the Rawlsian maximin model are par-
ticularly sensitive to the benefi t of the least well-off is 
further confi rmed by comparing their ratings of the in-
come distributions with the lowest income quintiles (the 
distributions in the low-equality level) with the ratings of 
participants fi tting the other models. For this comparison 
we can utilize the Need sensitivity score used in the pre-
vious regression analysis. Those participants fi tting the 
Rawlsian maximin model have a mean Need sensitivi-
ty score of 4.93, while the mean scores of those fi tting 
other models are substantially higher: strong egalitarian 
(8.76), moderate egalitarian (5.88), mixed egalitarian-ef-
fi ciency (9.10), moderate effi ciency-maximizer (7.75), 
and strong effi ciency-maximizer (16.75). The differenc-
es between the mean scores for the Rawlsian maximin 
model and the other models are all statistically signifi -
cant, except the moderate egalitarian model.10 This dif-
ference sug gests that those participants fi tting the Raw-
lsian maximin model are particularly sensitive to need, 
or the welfare of the least well-off. This result gives us 
good reason to be lieve that participants fi tting the Raw-
lsian maximin model may be behaving not merely con-
sistently with Rawls’ the ory, but acting as they do for 
the normative reasons Rawls specifi es. 
Discussion
Our study is a synthesis of normative and empirical re-
search into distributive justice. We found that analytical-
ly distinct principles of distributive justice—equality, effi -
ciency, merit, and need—all play a role in individuals’ 
behavior when making judgments concerning income 
distribution and that several independent factors infl u -fi ciency vs. medium equality/high ef fi ciency) as criteria to all of the models except the mixed equality-effi ciency model produces results 
very similar to those we report in the text, but with only 59.8% of 
participants categorized. With these added criteria, the proportion 
of Rawlsians among categorized par ticipants remains almost exact-
ly the same as with the models used in the text (17% vs. 18%), while 
the most signifi cant change is a substantial reduction in those meet-
ing the more restrictive strong egalitarian model (6% from 15%).
10 We also analyzed participants’ observed behavior using multino-
mial logistic regression taking the Rawlsian maximin model as the 
baseline, controlling for the uninteracted variables. We found no con-
sistent statistically signifi cant results not reported in the text, perhaps 
due to the low number of participants within each model once gender 
and race are taken into account. 
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ence how they use these principles. The fact that most 
individuals use several allocation principles simultane-
ously makes their behavior necessarily complex, but 
this complexity is nonetheless comprehensible: both be-
cause the underlying theoretical relationship among the 
princi ples is structured and because the factors infl uenc-
ing how individuals use them are predictable. In short, 
distributive justice behavior is complex yet structured. 
Before discussing our results, we want to address the 
possible limits to their generalizability. We used a conve-
nience sample of undergraduates, as is the case in much 
experimental research, and this raises legitimate ques-
tions about external validity (see Sears 1986). We made 
several efforts to make our participant pool as diverse as 
possi ble: one test site, the University of Houston, is un-
usually ethnically diverse (over 50% minority) while the 
other, Texas Southern University, is a traditionally black 
institu tion. We cannot claim to have a maximally rep-
resentative sample, nonetheless, foremost because our 
subject pool is skewed in terms of age.11 Survey data re-
veal that younger individuals are more egalitarian on av-
erage, and so it is plausible that a more representative 
sample would show participants less oriented to equali-
ty than our results sug gest. Whatever the limits of exter-
nal validity, however, our fi rst concern was internal va-
lidity (see Kinder and Palfry 1993). The strength of ex-
perimental research is precisely internal validity, and we 
took several measures designed to promote such validi-
ty. First, we included a rigorous manipulation check to 
guarantee that only participants who received the exper-
imental treatment and could prop erly interpret the infor-
mation provided were included. Second, by asking par-
ticipants in the post-experimental questionnaire about 
their own perceptions of the relation ship between mer-
it and income, and then entering that information as an 
independent variable in our regression analyses, we are 
able to determine that our experimental manipulations 
rather than participants’ pre-existing per ceptions explain 
our results. This test shows how using multiple regres-
sion analysis to enter additional controls can strength-
en experimental research. Theses steps com bined with 
the conformity of our results with theoretical predictions 
make us confi dent that we have strong inter nal validity 
and the basis to call for further research to confi rm and 
extend these results. 
Allocation Principles in Distributive 
Justice Judgments
One of our aims in this study was to examine how in-
dividuals use allocation principles in distributive jus-
tice judgments, in particular to explore and extend the 
results of our study (Scott et al. 2001) under different 
experimen tal conditions. Our fi ndings here generally 
confi rm that previous research, but with some important 
clarifi cations and interesting new extensions. 
Equality. We found considerable evidence that most in-
dividuals use equality as an allocation principle, even pre-
ferring more equal income distributions at the cost of a 
considerable loss in effi ciency. This result confi rms Scott 
et al. (2001), further reaffi rms Mitchell et al.’s (1993) 
fi nd ings and also suggests that equality plays a stronger 
role than found by Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992). 
Effi ciency. We found most individuals use effi ciency as 
well as equality and try to strike a balance between the 
two principles. This result accords with Okun’s (1975) 
infl uential framework for public policy analysis. Our 
fi nd ings concerning the factors that infl uence individu-
als’ equality-effi ciency preferences are also broadly con-
sistent with Scott et al. (2001), and in particular under-
score the strong gender difference they found. Likewise, 
we found that women tend to be more concerned with 
equality than men, and that men are more strongly ori-
ented toward effi ciency. We found no consistent differ-
ences between racial groups, although our results sug-
gest that tradition ally underprivileged minorities are no 
more egalitarian than whites and may even been some-
what more con cerned with effi ciency. 
Merit. We found important results concerning the in-
fl uence of gender and race on the way in which equal-
ity-effi ciency preferences are mediated by assumptions 
about the relationship between merit and income out-
comes. First, unlike the results of our earlier study (Scott 
et al. 2001), we found that both women’s and men’s 
equality-effi ciency preferences are infl uenced by their 
assumptions about merit, although we found this result 
for white par ticipants alone. In Scott et al. (2001) we un-
expectedly but consistently found this to be the case for 
women alone. When discussing this result, we hypoth-
esized that researchers might see the infl uence of merit 
assumptions among men if the cost of trading off equal-
ity for effi ciency were increased and if a larger partic-
ipant pool were em ployed. Our present study confi rms 
this hypothesis. These combined results suggest that the 
relationship between merit assumptions and equality-ef-
fi ciency preferences depends upon equality levels and 
11 The mean age of our sample is 22 (min. 18, max. 55) 25% of the 
sample is over 22. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test comparing our sub-
jects’ answers to questions in the post-experimental question naire 
taken from national surveys found no signifi cant difference in sim-
ilar age groups. 
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the costs of the trade offs between the two principles and, 
further, that men and women tend to respond differently 
in these different con texts. Second, we found that race 
has a surprisingly strong infl uence on the way in which 
equality-effi ciency prefer ences interact with information 
about merit. As noted above, the positive relationship 
we found between merit assumptions and equality-effi -
ciency preferences held for whites of both sexes alone; 
information about merit did not affect the equality-effi -
ciency preferences of minority participants. We will re-
turn this result concerning race below. 
Need. Our poverty line manipulation was designed to ex-
amine a distinct concern for need and the factors that in-
fl uence need sensitivity. We found that women showed a 
distinct sensitivity to need, but that men did not. We also 
found that white men are still concerned with merit at the 
highest levels of inequality and even with poverty an ex-
plicit issue, whereas women are instead affected by both 
the inequality of the distributions and independently by 
need. We suspect that the experimental design made it 
diffi cult to distinguish need sensitivity and intolerance for 
inequality, as was also the case for our earlier study (Scott 
et al. 2001). Finally, we found no statistically signifi cant 
differences in need sensitivity between racial groups. 
Race and Gender in Distributive 
Justice Behavior
Among the most signifi cant fi ndings in this study are 
those concerning race. Existing empirical literature gives 
very little, even confl icting, guidance in making predic-
tions. We must also use some caution in interpreting our 
results on this subject in particular because we cannot 
claim to have a representative sample in spite of the size 
and diversity of our participant pool. 
Our fi nding that race exerts an independent infl u-
ence on how individuals use allocation principles calls 
into question the widely accepted—but not unchal-
lenged—view in the existing behavioral literature that 
race has no strong independent predictive effect once 
one con trols for other variables such as gender, ideolo-
gy, and SES. Some of our results are consistent with this 
consen sus, including our fi nding that minorities are no 
more sensitive to need than whites. On the other hand, 
we found clear differences between racial groups in how 
par ticipants’ equality-effi ciency preferences were medi-
ated by information about merit. When reporting this re-
sult, we conjectured that minority participants may be 
sen sitive to information about merit because they ap-
pear to be suspicious about claims about the relationship 
be tween merit and income. We pointed as evidence for 
this conjecture to their signifi cantly lower estimations of 
that relationship in our own society compared to whites. 
This fi nding, as well as the supporting evidence from the 
questionnaire, calls into question Hochschild’s (1995) 
claim, based on interview and survey data, that blacks 
en dorse the “American dream” concerning merit and 
socio economic mobility. Class identity (Jackman 1994) 
or racial group identity (Dawson 1994) appear to lead 
mi norities to different views about distributive justice 
prin ciples, and perhaps even different ways of thinking 
about them (see Kinder and Winter 2001). In sum, our 
study is the fi rst study of which we are aware that sug-
gests that race exerts an independent infl uence on dis-
tributive justice. 
We also found considerable differences in how gen-
der infl uences individuals’ use of allocation principles, 
which suggest several refl ections related to our fi nd-
ings regard ing race. Consistent with previous research, 
we found that women are substantially more concerned 
with equality and more sensitive to need than men. Un-
like our earlier study, (Scott et al. 2001), we did not fi nd 
a gender gap in how merit assumptions affect equality-
effi ciency pref erences, but we did confi rm that the in-
teraction among these principles is different for men 
and women in differ ent contexts. Our fi ndings concern-
ing need in particular parallel fi ndings regarding the dif-
ferent weights men and women give to social policy is-
sues and suggest the same so cioeconomic or other sit-
uational explanations which have been advanced for 
these results (Piven 1985; Gilens 1988; Welch and Hib-
bing 1992; Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 1998). In terms 
of our experiment, both women’s and minorities’ tradi-
tional socioeconomic position might ex plain why they 
weigh equality or need more heavily than men or whites. 
Likewise, their traditional vulnerability may explain 
why women tend to weigh equality more heavily than 
men, and why minorities appear suspicious of claims 
about merit. Our fi ndings concerning gender and for 
race suggest we might look for explanations to the struc-
tural or situational differences in society between wom-
en and men and between whites and traditionally under-
privileged minorities. In any case, our fi ndings in dicate 
a more complex theory and subtler instruments are nec-
essary in studying gender and race differences in public 
opinion and behavior. 
Rawlsian and Other Strategies 
in Prioritizing Allocation Principles
One of our principal aims in this study was to analyze 
strategies individuals use in prioritizing distributive prin-
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ciples, in particular to determine to what extent they use 
a Rawlsian maximin strategy. Our experimental de sign 
enabled us to develop several theoretical models for how 
individuals might prioritize allocation princi ples, which 
we then used to categorize their observed behavior. Our 
ability to capture the observed behavior of over three-
quarters of the participants further con fi rms that distrib-
utive justice behavior is complex yet structured. 
We found that the observed behavior of a substan-
tial number of participants is consistent with a Rawlsian 
max imin strategy—itself an important result for both 
norma tive and empirical research. This result is in op-
position to the absence of support for Rawlsian solution 
found by Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) and tends to 
support Mitchell et al. (1993), although we believe that 
our study more clearly distinguished between egalitarian 
and Rawl sian strategies and therefore offers more com-
pelling evi dence. While we are prepared only to claim 
that some of our participants exhibit behavior consistent 
with Rawls’ predictions, since we do not have access to 
their specifi c reasoning, supporting evidence concern-
ing their partic ular sensitivity to the welfare of the least 
well-off suggests they may indeed be making judgments 
in accordance with the normative reasons Rawls pro-
vides. Further research is required to examine the char-
acteristics of this subset of apparent Rawlsians and their 
reasoning. We should nonetheless not allow the support 
we fi nd for Rawls to ob scure the evidence that speaks 
against his theory. After all, the clear majority of par-
ticipants in our study prioritized allocation principles in 
ways directly contrary to Rawls’ prescriptions and most 
participants also clearly regarded merit as a legitimate 
moral principle, again contrary to Rawls’ argument. Our 
fi ndings concerning gender and racial differences in 
distributive justice behavior are sim ilarly in some ten-
sion with Rawls since he assumes that such differences 
should not matter behind “the veil of ignorance.” More 
consistent with our fi ndings is Okin’s (1989) argument 
that gender should be taken into ac count in the “original 
position.” Rawls’ theory of “justice as fairness” is one 
alternative among competing strategies to prioritize and 
balance potentially competing allocation principles. 
Conclusion
Philosophers, politicians, and ordinary people alike are 
faced with complex normative and empirical questions 
concerning the distribution of the benefi ts and burdens 
of society. We should therefore not be surprised to dis-
cover that distributive justice behavior itself is com-
plex. The complexity of distributive justice judgments 
is refl ected in the most prominent contemporary theo-
ry of justice, Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, for it 
involves a specifi c ordering of the competing principles 
used in distributive justice judgments. Yet Rawls’ en-
deavor and the results of our own study provide testimo-
ny to the structure of dis tributive justice behavior that 
lies beneath the complexity. Our study uncovers part of 
the complex structure of dis tributive justice judgments, 
and our fi ndings should in form both normative and em-
pirical inquiry. The fact that the principles used in dis-
tributive justice judgments are interrelated and that in-
dividuals’ preferences concerning them are nonsepara-
ble, for example, suggests that survey research and other 
instruments must use a sophisticated design that refl ects 
the true structure of these principles in order to produce 
accurate and valid results. We hope that our study shows 
the fruitfulness of a synthesis of nor mative and empiri-
cal approaches to distributive justice. 
Appendix
Participant Instructions
Note: Portions in italics are varied between subject. The 
fi rst selection specifi es the degree to which income is ex-
plained by effort and ability (10%, 50%, 90%), while 
the other selections specify the level of the poverty line 
($10,000 and $15,000). 
Assessment of Income Distributions. Please read the de-
scription below. Please ask if you have any questions at 
any time. 
Imagine that you are an outside advisor to the coun-
try described below. You are not a member of the coun-
try. You are being asked to give your opinion on what 
policies would be best for the country. We are interest-
ed in your ideas about how income should be distributed 
when your own interests are not at stake. 
Country D is a self-governed society made up of peo-
ple of a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds. There 
is a broad variety of occupations in the society. Scientif-
ic stud ies have demonstrated that the amount of income 
a person receives in Country D is due almost entirely to 
the person’s effort and ability. People who are willing to 
work hard, take some risks, and acquire the proper ed-
ucation and skills have a very good chance of having a 
higher income. On the other hand, people who are not 
willing to do these things have a very good chance of 
having a lower income. The amount of income a person 
receives is 90% due to his or her effort and ability, and 
only 10% due to luck, connections, and similar factors. 
The people of Country D are considering a num ber 
of policies for their society. Economic studies have dem-
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onstrated what effects the different policies will have on 
the average income in the country as a whole (standard 
of living) and on differences in people’s income (income 
distribution). Backers of the different policies are con-
vinced by these studies and do not disagree about the ef-
fects of the policies. They do disagree on which policy 
is the best for their country. Among other considerations, 
certain analysts are more concerned about the average in-
come, while others are more concerned about equality 
of income. 
You are being asked to give your opinion about how 
good the different policies would be for Country D based 
on their effects on income. 
In order to assess these different policies, you will 
be presented with charts that show their effects on in-
come. All the income fi gures you will be given are for 
after tax income for four-person families. All income fi g-
ures are in U.S. dollar equivalents. The charts show fam-
ily incomes broken down into each fi fth (20%) of fam-
ilies (or each “quintile”), from the poorest 20% of fam-
ilies in terms of income up to the wealthiest 20%. The 
charts also give you information about the average in-
come in the country as a whole and the income inequali-
ty ratio. The income inequality ratio is a commonly used 
measure of income inequality and is fi gured by dividing 
the income of the highest 20% of families by the income 
of the lowest 20% of families. 
The chart below [see Figure 1] shows family in-
comes for Country D. As you can see, average family 
income after taxes are: $16,000 per year for the poorest 
20% of fami lies, $26,000 for the next 20%, $34,000 for 
the next 20%, $53,000 for the next 20%, and $71,000 
for the wealthiest 20%. The poverty line (the amount of 
income needed to provide for the basic needs of food, 
housing, clothing, and medical care for a four-person 
family) is $15,000. The in come inequality ratio is 4.4 
($71,000 divided by $16,000). 
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